Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!

K. Leufkens; R.J.A.P. Peeters

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.022

Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!

K. Leufkens
, R.J.A.P. Peeters^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the performance of auction formats when synergies are present between sequentially auctioned objects. Although the second-price auction format performs better in terms of efficiency and revenue, bankruptcy problems are less severe in the first-price auction format.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	64-69
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	97
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.022
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2007

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10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.022

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Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!
Leufkens, K. & Peeters, R. J. A. P., 1 Jan 2006, Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, 10 p. (METEOR Research Memorandum; No. 034).
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title = "Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!",

abstract = "This paper studies the performance of auction formats when synergies are present between sequentially auctioned objects. Although the second-price auction format performs better in terms of efficiency and revenue, bankruptcy problems are less severe in the first-price auction format.",

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Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!

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Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!

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