Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games

Jeroen Kuipers*, Janos Flesch, Gijs Schoenmakers, Koos Vrieze

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Web of Science)

Abstract

We consider sequential multi-player games with perfect information and with deterministic transitions. The players receive a reward upon termination of the game, which depends on the state where the game was terminated. If the game does not terminate, then the rewards of the players are equal to zero. We prove that, for every game in this class, a subgame perfect epsilon-equilibrium exists, for all epsilon > 0. The proof is constructive and suggests a finite algorithm to calculate such an equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)603-662
Number of pages60
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume71
Issue number2
Early online date1 Apr 2020
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2021

Keywords

  • Perfect information game
  • Recursive game
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium
  • EQUILIBRIA

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