Abstract
We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, the transitions are controlled by one player; (2) the payoffs are equal to zero in every nonabsorbing state; (3) the payoffs are nonnegative in every absorbing state. We propose a new iterative method to analyze these games. With respect to the expected average reward, we prove the existence of a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies for every epsilon > 0. Moreover, if all transitions are deterministic, we obtain a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 193-207 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Mathematics of Operations Research |
Volume | 35 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Feb 2010 |
Keywords
- stochastic games
- perfect information games
- recursive games
- subgame-perfect equilibria
- 2-PLAYER STOCHASTIC GAMES
- QUITTING GAMES
- STOPPING GAMES