Strike three: Discrimination, incentives and evaluation

C.A. Parsons, J. Suleaman, M.C. Yates, D. Hamermesh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

49 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Major League Baseball umpires express their racial/ethnic preferences when they evaluate pitchers. Strikes are called less often if the umpire and pitcher do not match race/ethnicity, but mainly where there is little scrutiny of umpires. Pitchers understand the incentives and throw pitches that allow umpires less subjective judgment (e. g., fastballs over home plate) when they anticipate bias. These direct and indirect effects bias performance measures of minorities downward. The results suggest how discrimination alters discriminated groups' behavior generally. They imply that biases in measured productivity must be accounted for in generating measures of wage discrimination. (JEL J15, J31, J44, J71, L83)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1410-1435
Number of pages26
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume101
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2011

Keywords

  • MAJOR-LEAGUE BASEBALL
  • RACIAL-DISCRIMINATION
  • PERFORMANCE
  • STEREOTYPES
  • REFEREES
  • BEHAVIOR
  • SPORTS

Cite this

Parsons, C. A., Suleaman, J., Yates, M. C., & Hamermesh, D. (2011). Strike three: Discrimination, incentives and evaluation. American Economic Review, 101(4), 1410-1435. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.4.1410