TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods

AU - Dutta, B.

AU - Peters, H.J.M.

AU - Sen, A.

PY - 2002/1/1

Y1 - 2002/1/1

N2 - Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of Euclidean space are considered. Such an economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper establishes that any strategy-proof (in the sense of A. Gibbard, Econometrica 45 (1977), 665--681) and unanimous mechanism must be a random dictatorship. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D71, H40, C60.

AB - Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a convex subset of Euclidean space are considered. Such an economy arises for instance in the classical problem of allocating a given budget to finance the provision of several public goods where the agents have monotonically increasing strictly convex continuous preferences. A probabilistic mechanism assigns a probability distribution over the feasible alternatives to any profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper establishes that any strategy-proof (in the sense of A. Gibbard, Econometrica 45 (1977), 665--681) and unanimous mechanism must be a random dictatorship. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D71, H40, C60.

U2 - 10.1006/jeth.2001.2896

DO - 10.1006/jeth.2001.2896

M3 - Article

VL - 106

SP - 392

EP - 416

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

ER -