Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval

Abhinaba Lahiri; Ton Storcken

doi:10.1007/s00355-018-01169-z

Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval

Abhinaba Lahiri^*, Ton Storcken

^*Corresponding author for this work

QE Math. Economics & Game Theory

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We consider collective decision rules placing finitely many public bads in a region, modeled by a line segment. Agents’ preferences are lexicographic extensions (lexmin) of euclidean single dipped preferences on this interval. The class of all rules satisfying strategy-proofness and pareto optimality is characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations by monotone voting.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	49-62
Number of pages	14
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	53
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-01169-z
Publication status	Published - Jun 2019

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AB - We consider collective decision rules placing finitely many public bads in a region, modeled by a line segment. Agents’ preferences are lexicographic extensions (lexmin) of euclidean single dipped preferences on this interval. The class of all rules satisfying strategy-proofness and pareto optimality is characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations by monotone voting.

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JO - Social Choice and Welfare

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Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval

Abstract

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