Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval

Abhinaba Lahiri*, Ton Storcken

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


We consider collective decision rules placing finitely many public bads in a region, modeled by a line segment. Agents’ preferences are lexicographic extensions (lexmin) of euclidean single dipped preferences on this interval. The class of all rules satisfying strategy-proofness and pareto optimality is characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations by monotone voting.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)49-62
Number of pages14
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2019


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