Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval

Abhinaba Lahiri*, Ton Storcken

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We consider collective decision rules placing finitely many public bads in a region, modeled by a line segment. Agents’ preferences are lexicographic extensions (lexmin) of euclidean single dipped preferences on this interval. The class of all rules satisfying strategy-proofness and pareto optimality is characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations by monotone voting.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)49-62
Number of pages14
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume53
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2019

Cite this

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Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval. / Lahiri, Abhinaba; Storcken, Ton.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 53, No. 1, 06.2019, p. 49-62.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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AB - We consider collective decision rules placing finitely many public bads in a region, modeled by a line segment. Agents’ preferences are lexicographic extensions (lexmin) of euclidean single dipped preferences on this interval. The class of all rules satisfying strategy-proofness and pareto optimality is characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations by monotone voting.

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