Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc

M. Öztürk*, H.J.M. Peters, A.J.A. Storcken

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. This framework models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region that has the shape of a disc. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)14-16
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2013

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