Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc

M. Öztürk; H.J.M. Peters; A.J.A. Storcken

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.012

Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc

M. Öztürk^*, H.J.M. Peters, A.J.A. Storcken

^*Corresponding author for this work

Quantitative Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. This framework models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region that has the shape of a disc. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	14-16
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	119
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.012
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2013

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title = "Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc",

abstract = "In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. This framework models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region that has the shape of a disc. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",

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N2 - In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. This framework models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region that has the shape of a disc. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

AB - In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. This framework models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region that has the shape of a disc. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.012

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SP - 14

EP - 16

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc

Abstract

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