Strategy-Proof Cardinal Decision Schemes

D. Bhaskar, H.J.M. Peters, A. Sen

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13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyses strategy-proof mechanisms or decision schemes which map profiles of cardinal utility functions to lotteries over a finite set of outcomes. We provide a new proof of hylland’s theorem which shows that the only strategy-proof cardinal decision scheme satisfying a weak unanimity property is the random dictatorship. Our proof technique assumes a framework where individuals can discern utility differences only if the difference is at least some fixed number which we call the grid size. We also prove a limit random dictatorship result which shows that any sequence of strategy-proof and unanimous decision schemes defined on a sequence of decreasing grid sizes approaching zero must converge to a random dictatorship.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)163-179
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume28
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2007

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