Stochastic stability for roommate markets

B.E. Klaus*, F. Klijn, M. Walzl

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

31 Citations (Web of Science)


We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic stability is a characteristic of the core. Several solution concepts have been proposed to extend the core to all roommate markets (including those with an empty core). An important implication of our results is that the set of absorbing matchings is the only solution concept that is core consistent and shares the stochastic stability characteristic with the core.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2218-2240
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2010

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