State aid benchmarking and tax rulings: Can we keep it simple?

Raymond Luja*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic

Abstract

Tax rulings and advance pricing agreements may run the risk of providing an advantage to taxpayers upon ex-post analysis. This contribution will first focus on how group companies may differ from stand-alone companies for state aid purposes and address the commission’s potential use of secret comparables as part of a transfer pricing analysis. A flowchart to determine when a ruling may be deemed selective is provided. Then mismatches will be addressed in tax treaty situations, like the (de)recognition of permanent establishments. Lastly, the (ir)relevance of the new eu tax ruling database for state aid investigations will be discussed.keywordstransfer pricegroup companytaxable profitexcess profittransfer price rulethese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationState aid law and business taxation
EditorsWolfgang Schön, Isabelle Richelle, Edoardo Traversa
Place of PublicationBerlin Heidelberg
PublisherSpringer
Pages111-132
ISBN (Electronic)978-36-6253-055-9
ISBN (Print)978-36-6253-054-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Publication series

SeriesMax Planck Institute Studies In Tax Law and Public Finance
Number6

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