Stability in Matching with Couples having Responsive Preferences

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Abstract

This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a stable matching may fail to exist even when both couples and institutions have responsive preferences. Next, we provide conditions on couples' preferences that are necessary and sufficient to ensure a stable matching for every preference profile where institutions may have any responsive preference. Finally, we do the same with respect to institutions' preferences, that is, we provide conditions on institutions' preferences that are necessary and sufficient
to ensure a stable matching for every preference profile where couples may have any responsive preference.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherSocial Science Research Network (SSRN)
Number of pages29
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2021

Publication series

SeriesSSRN Working Paper Series
Number3288199

JEL classifications

  • c78 - "Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory"
  • d47 - Market Design

Keywords

  • many-to-one two-sided matching
  • stability
  • togetherness

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