Stability in Matching with Couples having Responsive Preferences

Shashwat Khare; Souvik Roy; Ton Storcken

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3288199

Stability in Matching with Couples having Responsive Preferences

Shashwat Khare^*, Souvik Roy, Ton Storcken

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Working paper / Preprint › Working paper

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Abstract

This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a stable matching may fail to exist even when both couples and institutions have responsive preferences. Next, we provide conditions on couples' preferences that are necessary and sufficient to ensure a stable matching for every preference profile where institutions may have any responsive preference. Finally, we do the same with respect to institutions' preferences, that is, we provide conditions on institutions' preferences that are necessary and sufficient
to ensure a stable matching for every preference profile where couples may have any responsive preference.

Original language	English
Publisher	Social Science Research Network (SSRN)
Number of pages	29
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3288199
Publication status	Published - Feb 2021

Publication series

Series	SSRN Working Paper Series
Number	3288199

JEL classifications

c78 - "Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory"
d47 - Market Design

Keywords

many-to-one two-sided matching
stability
togetherness

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10.2139/ssrn.3288199

responsiveness

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AB - This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a stable matching may fail to exist even when both couples and institutions have responsive preferences. Next, we provide conditions on couples' preferences that are necessary and sufficient to ensure a stable matching for every preference profile where institutions may have any responsive preference. Finally, we do the same with respect to institutions' preferences, that is, we provide conditions on institutions' preferences that are necessary and sufficientto ensure a stable matching for every preference profile where couples may have any responsive preference.

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Stability in Matching with Couples having Responsive Preferences

Abstract

Publication series

JEL classifications

Keywords

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