Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs

Florian Engl; Arno Riedl; Roberto A. Weber

doi:10.1257/mic.20180336

Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs

Florian Engl^*, Arno Riedl, Roberto A. Weber

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others' cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	261-299
Number of pages	39
Journal	American Economic Journal-Microeconomics
Volume	13
Issue number	4
Early online date	2021
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180336
Publication status	Published - Nov 2021

JEL classifications

d72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
c92 - Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
d02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
h41 - Public Goods

Keywords

beliefs
institutions
public goods
social preferences
spillover effect
INCENTIVES
MOTIVATION
MULTIPLE GAMES
CULTURE
PUBLIC-GOODS
CHOICE
POLICY
PUNISHMENT
ENFORCEMENT
SOCIAL NORMS

Access to Document

10.1257/mic.20180336

Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs
Engl, F. (Creator), Riedl, A. (Creator) & Weber, R. A. (Creator), Maastricht University, 2 Aug 2021
DOI: 10.3886/E128682V1
Dataset/Software: Dataset
Data and Code for: Spillover effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs
Engl, F. (Creator), Riedl, A. (Creator) & Weber, R. (Creator), ICPSR, 21 Oct 2021
DOI: 10.3886/e128682v1, https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/128682/version/V1/view
Dataset/Software: Dataset

1 Working paper

Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs
Engl, F., Riedl, A. & Weber, R. A., 13 Jun 2017, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics, (GSBE Research Memoranda; No. 016).
Research output: Working paper / Preprint › Working paper

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Cite this

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title = "Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs",

abstract = "Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others' cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects.",

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AB - Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others' cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects.

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KW - institutions

KW - public goods

KW - social preferences

KW - spillover effect

KW - INCENTIVES

KW - MOTIVATION

KW - MULTIPLE GAMES

KW - CULTURE

KW - PUBLIC-GOODS

KW - CHOICE

KW - POLICY

KW - PUNISHMENT

KW - ENFORCEMENT

KW - SOCIAL NORMS

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M3 - Article

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JO - American Economic Journal-Microeconomics

JF - American Economic Journal-Microeconomics

IS - 4

ER -

Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs

Abstract

JEL classifications

Keywords

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