TY - JOUR
T1 - Spatial Proximity and Complementarities in the Trading of Tacit Knowledge
AU - Aydogan, N.
AU - Lyon, Th.P.
PY - 2004/1/1
Y1 - 2004/1/1
N2 - We model knowledge-trading coalitions in which the transfer of tacit knowledge is unverifiable and requires face-to-face contact, making spatial proximity important. When there are sufficient “complementarities” in knowledge exchange, successful exchange is facilitated if firms can meet in a central location, thereby economizing on travel costs. When complementarities are small, however, a central location may be undesirable because it is more vulnerable to cheating than is a structure involving bilateral travel between firms. We believe that our framework may help explain the structure and stability of multimember technology trading coalitions, such as sematech and silicon valley.
AB - We model knowledge-trading coalitions in which the transfer of tacit knowledge is unverifiable and requires face-to-face contact, making spatial proximity important. When there are sufficient “complementarities” in knowledge exchange, successful exchange is facilitated if firms can meet in a central location, thereby economizing on travel costs. When complementarities are small, however, a central location may be undesirable because it is more vulnerable to cheating than is a structure involving bilateral travel between firms. We believe that our framework may help explain the structure and stability of multimember technology trading coalitions, such as sematech and silicon valley.
U2 - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.09.003
DO - 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.09.003
M3 - Article
SN - 0167-7187
VL - 22
SP - 1115
EP - 1135
JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization
JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization
IS - 8-9
ER -