Single-plateaued choice

W. Bossert, H.J.M. Peters

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Single-plateaued preferences generalize single-peaked preferences by allowing for multiple best elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-plateauedness in a choice-theoretic setting. Single-plateaued choice is characterized by means of a collinear interval continuity property in the presence of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Further results establish that, our notion of single-plateauedness conforms to the motivation underlying the term and we analyze the consequences of alternative continuity properties. The importance of basic assumptions such as closedness and convexity is discussed.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)134-139
Number of pages6
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume66
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2013

Keywords

  • PURE PUBLIC-GOODS
  • STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
  • PEAKED PREFERENCES
  • ECONOMIES
  • RULE

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