Single-dipped preferences: dips-only and peaks-only rules

Doudou Gong; Bas Dietzenbacher

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2026.107537

Single-dipped preferences: dips-only and peaks-only rules

Doudou Gong
, Bas Dietzenbacher^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We evaluate allocation rules on the basis of their informational simplicity. In particular, we study dips-only and peaks-only rules, i.e. the selected allocation only depends on either the dips or the peaks of the agents. We focus on Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and envy-freeness and characterize all dips-only and peaks-only rules satisfying these properties.

Original language	English
Article number	107537
Number of pages	4
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	70
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2026.107537
Publication status	Published - Jan 2027

Keywords

resource allocation
single-dipped preferences
dips-only
peaks-only

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10.1016/j.orl.2026.107537Licence: CC BY

Cite this

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title = "Single-dipped preferences: dips-only and peaks-only rules",

abstract = "One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We evaluate allocation rules on the basis of their informational simplicity. In particular, we study dips-only and peaks-only rules, i.e. the selected allocation only depends on either the dips or the peaks of the agents. We focus on Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and envy-freeness and characterize all dips-only and peaks-only rules satisfying these properties.",

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author = "Doudou Gong and Bas Dietzenbacher",

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N2 - One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We evaluate allocation rules on the basis of their informational simplicity. In particular, we study dips-only and peaks-only rules, i.e. the selected allocation only depends on either the dips or the peaks of the agents. We focus on Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and envy-freeness and characterize all dips-only and peaks-only rules satisfying these properties.

AB - One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We evaluate allocation rules on the basis of their informational simplicity. In particular, we study dips-only and peaks-only rules, i.e. the selected allocation only depends on either the dips or the peaks of the agents. We focus on Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and envy-freeness and characterize all dips-only and peaks-only rules satisfying these properties.

KW - resource allocation

KW - single-dipped preferences

KW - dips-only

KW - peaks-only

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2026.107537

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2026.107537

M3 - Article

SN - 0167-6377

VL - 70

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

M1 - 107537

ER -

Single-dipped preferences: dips-only and peaks-only rules

Abstract

Keywords

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