Sharing costs in highways: a game theoretic approach

Jeroen Kuipers, Manuel A. Mosquera, José M. Zarzuelo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

This paper introduces a new class of games, highway games, which arise from situations where there is a common resource that agents will jointly use. That resource is an ordered set of several indivisible sections, where each section has an associated fixed cost and each agent requires some consecutive sections. We present an easy formula to calculate the Shapley value, and we present an efficient procedure to calculate the nucleolus for this class of games.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)158-168
Number of pages11
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume228
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Cite this