Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice

Hans Peters*, Panos Protopapas

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We consider choice correspondences that assign a subset to every choice set of alternatives, where the total set of alternatives is an arbitrary finite or infinite set. We focus on the relations between several extensions of the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives on one hand, and conditions on the revealed preference relation on sets, notably the weak axiom of revealed preference, on the other hand. We also establish the connection between the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives and so-called strong sets; the latter characterize a social choice correspondence satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages19
JournalTheory and Decision
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 8 Sep 2020

Keywords

  • Revealed preference axioms
  • Multi-valued choice
  • Independence of irrelevant alternatives
  • Strong sets
  • WARP

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