Abstract
The sequential coalition formation model of bloch to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts [bloch, f., 1996. Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division. Games econ. Behav. 14, 90–123]. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of bloch's model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core [kóczy, l.á., 2007. A recursive core for partition function form games. Theory dec. 63, 41–51].
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 559-565 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 66 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2009 |