Sequential claim games

Q.Q. Kong; H. Peters

doi:10.1007/s00291-023-00711-5

Sequential claim games

Q.Q. Kong, H. Peters^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We consider the estate division or bankruptcy problem and assume that players sequentially put claims on the estate. Each part of the estate is then divided proportionally with respect to the number of claims on it. We focus on myopic play: players first claim the hitherto least claimed parts, and on subgame perfect equilibria. Our main result is that myopic strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium if punishments for deviators are included.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	955-975
Number of pages	21
Journal	OR Spektrum : quantitive approaches in management
Volume	45
Early online date	1 Feb 2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-023-00711-5
Publication status	Published - Sept 2023

Keywords

Game theory
Estate division
Sequential claim game
Myopic play
Subgame perfect equilibrium
THEORETIC ANALYSIS
TAXATION PROBLEMS
BANKRUPTCY
RULES

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10.1007/s00291-023-00711-5Licence: CC BY

Cite this

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title = "Sequential claim games",

abstract = "We consider the estate division or bankruptcy problem and assume that players sequentially put claims on the estate. Each part of the estate is then divided proportionally with respect to the number of claims on it. We focus on myopic play: players first claim the hitherto least claimed parts, and on subgame perfect equilibria. Our main result is that myopic strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium if punishments for deviators are included.",

keywords = "Game theory, Estate division, Sequential claim game, Myopic play, Subgame perfect equilibrium, THEORETIC ANALYSIS, TAXATION PROBLEMS, BANKRUPTCY, RULES",

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N2 - We consider the estate division or bankruptcy problem and assume that players sequentially put claims on the estate. Each part of the estate is then divided proportionally with respect to the number of claims on it. We focus on myopic play: players first claim the hitherto least claimed parts, and on subgame perfect equilibria. Our main result is that myopic strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium if punishments for deviators are included.

AB - We consider the estate division or bankruptcy problem and assume that players sequentially put claims on the estate. Each part of the estate is then divided proportionally with respect to the number of claims on it. We focus on myopic play: players first claim the hitherto least claimed parts, and on subgame perfect equilibria. Our main result is that myopic strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium if punishments for deviators are included.

KW - Game theory

KW - Estate division

KW - Sequential claim game

KW - Myopic play

KW - Subgame perfect equilibrium

KW - THEORETIC ANALYSIS

KW - TAXATION PROBLEMS

KW - BANKRUPTCY

KW - RULES

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DO - 10.1007/s00291-023-00711-5

M3 - Article

SN - 1436-6304

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SP - 955

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JO - OR Spektrum : quantitive approaches in management

JF - OR Spektrum : quantitive approaches in management

ER -

Sequential claim games

Abstract

Keywords

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