Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies

K. Leufkens; R.J.A.P. Peeters; A.J. Vermeulen

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.08.030

Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies

K. Leufkens, R.J.A.P. Peeters^*, A.J. Vermeulen

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We show that synergies enhance bidding competition to such an extent that they are a curse rather than a blessing for the bidders.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	139-141
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	109
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.08.030
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2010

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10.1016/j.econlet.2010.08.030

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Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies
Leufkens, K., Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Vermeulen, A. J., 1 Jan 2010, Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, 13 p. (METEOR Research Memorandum; No. 007).
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title = "Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies",

abstract = "We show that synergies enhance bidding competition to such an extent that they are a curse rather than a blessing for the bidders.",

author = "K. Leufkens and R.J.A.P. Peeters and A.J. Vermeulen",

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N2 - We show that synergies enhance bidding competition to such an extent that they are a curse rather than a blessing for the bidders.

AB - We show that synergies enhance bidding competition to such an extent that they are a curse rather than a blessing for the bidders.

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.08.030

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.08.030

M3 - Article

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies

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Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies

Cite this