Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies

K. Leufkens, R.J.A.P. Peeters, A.J. Vermeulen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that synergies enhance bidding competition to such an extent that they are a curse rather than a blessing for the bidders.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)139-141
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume109
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2010

Research Output

  • 7 Citations
  • 1 Working paper

Sequential auctions with synergies: the paradox of positive synergies

Leufkens, K., Peeters, R. J. A. P. & Vermeulen, A. J., 1 Jan 2010, Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, 13 p. (METEOR Research Memorandum; No. 007).

Research output: Working paperProfessional

Open Access
File
7 Citations (Scopus)
329 Downloads (Pure)

Cite this