## Abstract

Using a network approach we provide a characterization of a separating equilibrium for standard signaling games where the sender's payoff function is quasi-linear. Given a strategy of the sender, we construct a network where the node set and the length between two nodes are the set of the sender's type and the difference of signaling costs, respectively. Construction of a separating equilibrium is then equivalent to constructing the length between two nodes in the network under the condition that the response of the receiver is a node potential. When the set of the sender's type is a real interval, shortest path lengths are antisymmetric and a node potential is unique up to a constant. A strategy of the sender in a separating equilibrium is characterized by some differential equation with a unique solution. Our results can be readily applied to a broad range of economic situations, such as for example the standard job market signaling model of Spence, a model not captured by earlier papers.

Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1033-1054 |

Number of pages | 22 |

Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |

Volume | 48 |

Issue number | 4 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - Dec 2019 |

## JEL classifications

- c72 - Noncooperative Games
- d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"

## Keywords

- signaling game
- seperating equilibrium
- Node potential
- Separating equilibrium
- INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
- MODEL
- Signaling game