Self-reporting in optimal law enforcement when there are criminal teams

E. Feess, M. Walzl

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We extend the analysis of self-reporting schemes to criminal teams. When the violators behave non-cooperatively, maximum deterrence can be reached at virtually no cost by designing a prisoners' dilemma. One drawback of such a scheme is that it might induce cooperative behaviour in the self-reporting stage. If the cooperation rate is increasing the benefits from cooperation, it is optimal to impose less than the maximum fine if both individuals self-report. The same result occurs for imperfect self-reporting technologies where the conviction of one agent does not necessarily lead to a conviction of his accomplice.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)333-348
Number of pages15
JournalEconomica
Volume2004
Issue number71
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2004

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