Search for a moving target in a competitive environment

Benoit Duvocelle*, Janos Flesch, Hui Min Shi, Dries Vermeulen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

3 Citations (Web of Science)

Abstract

We consider a discrete-time dynamic search game in which a number of players compete to find an invisible object that is moving according to a time-varying Markov chain. We examine the subgame perfect equilibria of these games. The main result of the paper is that the set of subgame perfect equilibria is exactly the set of greedy strategy profiles, i.e. those strategy profiles in which the players always choose an action that maximizes their probability of immediately finding the object. We discuss various variations and extensions of the model.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)547-557
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume50
Issue number2
Early online date17 Feb 2021
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2021

Keywords

  • Game theory
  • Search game
  • Optimal search
  • Greedy strategy
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium

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