Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game

R.J.A.P. Peeters, M. Vorsatz, M. Walzl

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We conducted an experiment in which subjects played a sender–receiver game with and without rewarding opportunities. We find that rewards enhance the receiver's propensity to trust the sender's message but do not influence the sender's probability to tell the truth. Moreover, subjects who reward tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of rewarding opportunities.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)148-150
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume101
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2008

Research Output

  • 5 Citations
  • 1 Working paper

Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game

Peeters, R. J. A. P., Vorsatz, M. & Walzl, M., 1 Jan 2007, Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, 14 p. (METEOR Research Memorandum; No. 019).

Research output: Working paperProfessional

Open Access
File
46 Downloads (Pure)

Cite this

Peeters, R. J. A. P., Vorsatz, M., & Walzl, M. (2008). Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game. Economics Letters, 101(2), 148-150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.016