Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game

R.J.A.P. Peeters; M. Vorsatz; M. Walzl

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.016

Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game

R.J.A.P. Peeters, M. Vorsatz^*, M. Walzl

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We conducted an experiment in which subjects played a sender–receiver game with and without rewarding opportunities. We find that rewards enhance the receiver's propensity to trust the sender's message but do not influence the sender's probability to tell the truth. Moreover, subjects who reward tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of rewarding opportunities.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	148-150
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	101
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.016
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2008

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10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.016

1 Working paper

Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
Peeters, R. J. A. P., Vorsatz, M. & Walzl, M., 1 Jan 2007, Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, 14 p. (METEOR Research Memorandum; No. 019).
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title = "Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game",

abstract = "We conducted an experiment in which subjects played a sender–receiver game with and without rewarding opportunities. We find that rewards enhance the receiver's propensity to trust the sender's message but do not influence the sender's probability to tell the truth. Moreover, subjects who reward tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of rewarding opportunities.",

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AB - We conducted an experiment in which subjects played a sender–receiver game with and without rewarding opportunities. We find that rewards enhance the receiver's propensity to trust the sender's message but do not influence the sender's probability to tell the truth. Moreover, subjects who reward tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of rewarding opportunities.

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Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game

Abstract

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Research output

Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game

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