@article{a2fa2969db8947a5847b7a6389095d35,
title = "Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game",
abstract = "We conducted an experiment in which subjects played a sender–receiver game with and without rewarding opportunities. We find that rewards enhance the receiver's propensity to trust the sender's message but do not influence the sender's probability to tell the truth. Moreover, subjects who reward tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of rewarding opportunities.",
author = "R.J.A.P. Peeters and M. Vorsatz and M. Walzl",
year = "2008",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.016",
language = "English",
volume = "101",
pages = "148--150",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
number = "2",
}