Reward and punishment in a team contest

F.A. Heine, M. Strobel

Research output: Working paper / PreprintWorking paper

336 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

A team contest entails both public good situations within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other group members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two groups compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the team contest. Unlike what experimental studies in isolated public goods games indicate, we find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the group project. Furthermore, comparing treatment groups, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing. This is particularly pronounced for the between-group contest.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationMaastricht
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Number of pages35
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2015

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda
Number034

Cite this