Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games

T.J.W. Schulteis; A. Perea ý Monsuwé; H.J.M. Peters; A.J. Vermeulen

doi:10.1007/s00199-005-0061-7

Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games

T.J.W. Schulteis, A. Perea ý Monsuwé, H.J.M. Peters^*, A.J. Vermeulen

^*Corresponding author for this work

Quantitative Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in perea (2005) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	373-384
Number of pages	12
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	30
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0061-7
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2007

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title = "Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games",

abstract = "In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in perea (2005) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium.",

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AU - Vermeulen, A.J.

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N2 - In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in perea (2005) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium.

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M3 - Article

SN - 0938-2259

VL - 30

SP - 373

EP - 384

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

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Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games

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