Restricted domains with Pareto free pairs

Ton Storcken

Research output: Working paper / PreprintWorking paper

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Abstract

Among the domains restricted by Pareto free pairs we determine those allowing for preference rules being anonymous and independent of irrelevant alternatives. Essentially such preference rules appear to be based on a priority ordered at which adjacent alternatives can only be swapped in order is all agents agree with this swap.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Number of pages15
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 16 Sep 2021

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda
Number012
ISSN2666-8807

JEL classifications

  • d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
  • d79 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: Other

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