Resource location games

L.P.J. Schlicher; Marieke Musegaas; L.E. Westerink-Duijzer

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002

Resource location games

L.P.J. Schlicher^*
, Marieke Musegaas
, L.E. Westerink-Duijzer

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core non-emptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	300-304
Number of pages	5
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	47
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002
Publication status	Published - Jul 2019
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

CORE
COST ALLOCATION
Cooperative game
Core
Reallocation of resources
Resource-Profit allocations
SPARE PARTS

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10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002

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title = "Resource location games",

abstract = "In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core non-emptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "CORE, COST ALLOCATION, Cooperative game, Core, Reallocation of resources, Resource-Profit allocations, SPARE PARTS",

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year = "2019",

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doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Resource location games

AU - Schlicher, L.P.J.

AU - Musegaas, Marieke

AU - Westerink-Duijzer, L.E.

PY - 2019/7

Y1 - 2019/7

N2 - In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core non-emptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

AB - In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core non-emptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - CORE

KW - COST ALLOCATION

KW - Cooperative game

KW - Core

KW - Reallocation of resources

KW - Resource-Profit allocations

KW - SPARE PARTS

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002

M3 - Article

SN - 0167-6377

VL - 47

SP - 300

EP - 304

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

IS - 4

ER -

Resource location games

Abstract

Keywords

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