Resource location games

L.P.J. Schlicher*, Marieke Musegaas, L.E. Westerink-Duijzer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core non-emptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource-Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)300-304
Number of pages5
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume47
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2019
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • CORE
  • COST ALLOCATION
  • Cooperative game
  • Core
  • Reallocation of resources
  • Resource-Profit allocations
  • SPARE PARTS

Cite this

Schlicher, L. P. J., Musegaas, M., & Westerink-Duijzer, L. E. (2019). Resource location games. Operations Research Letters, 47(4), 300-304. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.002