Repeated games with bonuses

G. Schoenmakers; J. Flesch; F. Thuijsman; K. Vrieze

doi:10.1007/s10957-007-9318-6

Repeated games with bonuses

G. Schoenmakers^*, J. Flesch, F. Thuijsman, K. Vrieze

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

This paper deals with 2-player zero-sum repeated games in which player 1 receives a bonus at stage t if he repeats the action he played at stage t-1. We investigate the optimality of simple strategies for player 1. A simple strategy for player 1 consists of playing the same mixed action at every stage, irrespective of past play. Furthermore, for games in which player 1 has a simple optimal strategy, we characterize the set of stationary optimal strategies for player 2.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	459-473
Number of pages	15
Journal	Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Volume	136
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-007-9318-6
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2008

Access to Document

10.1007/s10957-007-9318-6Licence: CC BY-NC

Cite this

@article{ff2ec925c21742ce80610c3a031eacd6,

title = "Repeated games with bonuses",

abstract = "This paper deals with 2-player zero-sum repeated games in which player 1 receives a bonus at stage t if he repeats the action he played at stage t-1. We investigate the optimality of simple strategies for player 1. A simple strategy for player 1 consists of playing the same mixed action at every stage, irrespective of past play. Furthermore, for games in which player 1 has a simple optimal strategy, we characterize the set of stationary optimal strategies for player 2.",

author = "G. Schoenmakers and J. Flesch and F. Thuijsman and K. Vrieze",

year = "2008",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1007/s10957-007-9318-6",

language = "English",

volume = "136",

pages = "459--473",

journal = "Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications",

issn = "0022-3239",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Repeated games with bonuses

AU - Schoenmakers, G.

AU - Flesch, J.

AU - Thuijsman, F.

AU - Vrieze, K.

PY - 2008/1/1

Y1 - 2008/1/1

N2 - This paper deals with 2-player zero-sum repeated games in which player 1 receives a bonus at stage t if he repeats the action he played at stage t-1. We investigate the optimality of simple strategies for player 1. A simple strategy for player 1 consists of playing the same mixed action at every stage, irrespective of past play. Furthermore, for games in which player 1 has a simple optimal strategy, we characterize the set of stationary optimal strategies for player 2.

AB - This paper deals with 2-player zero-sum repeated games in which player 1 receives a bonus at stage t if he repeats the action he played at stage t-1. We investigate the optimality of simple strategies for player 1. A simple strategy for player 1 consists of playing the same mixed action at every stage, irrespective of past play. Furthermore, for games in which player 1 has a simple optimal strategy, we characterize the set of stationary optimal strategies for player 2.

U2 - 10.1007/s10957-007-9318-6

DO - 10.1007/s10957-007-9318-6

M3 - Article

SN - 0022-3239

VL - 136

SP - 459

EP - 473

JO - Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

JF - Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

ER -