Abstract
This paper focuses on the regulation of football agents in Europe by providing a comparative law and economics analysis. The paper starts by laying out a theoretical framework where the question is posed as to what reasons could support the need to regulate the activities of football agents. After having established that both information asymmetries and negative externalities could be a serious problem that merit regulation of some kind, the paper asks which type of regulation might be advanced by distinguishing between licensing, certification and conduct regulation. The difference between public and private regulation is equally discussed from an economic perspective.
On the back of this theoretical framework, the paper turns to the (private) regulations adopted by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), explaining the way in which these regulations have evolved and focusing on the most recent changes introduced by the FIFA Regulations on Working with intermediaries (RWI) of 2015, which have been the subject of serious criticism in the literature. We then move to a more detailed discussion of the regulation of the activities of football agents in four selected European countries (Belgium, England, France and Italy), explaining the nature of the regulation (private by a football association or public regulation), the requirements that the agents have to meet and the way in which the system is functioning in practice. As this comparative analysis shows, there exist substantial differences between these European countries as far as the key features of the regulation in question are concerned. The paper equally provides a critical comparison of the four European countries in the light of the theoretical framework and asks whether the differences identified would merit harmonization at the European level. As yet there has been little intervention from the EU in this domain, but there have been increasing calls for such intervention, more particularly from the European Parliament for a regulation of players’ agents.
The paper is the first of its kind to provide a critical law and economics analysis in a comparative perspective of the regulation of football agents in Europe.
On the back of this theoretical framework, the paper turns to the (private) regulations adopted by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), explaining the way in which these regulations have evolved and focusing on the most recent changes introduced by the FIFA Regulations on Working with intermediaries (RWI) of 2015, which have been the subject of serious criticism in the literature. We then move to a more detailed discussion of the regulation of the activities of football agents in four selected European countries (Belgium, England, France and Italy), explaining the nature of the regulation (private by a football association or public regulation), the requirements that the agents have to meet and the way in which the system is functioning in practice. As this comparative analysis shows, there exist substantial differences between these European countries as far as the key features of the regulation in question are concerned. The paper equally provides a critical comparison of the four European countries in the light of the theoretical framework and asks whether the differences identified would merit harmonization at the European level. As yet there has been little intervention from the EU in this domain, but there have been increasing calls for such intervention, more particularly from the European Parliament for a regulation of players’ agents.
The paper is the first of its kind to provide a critical law and economics analysis in a comparative perspective of the regulation of football agents in Europe.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-49 |
| Number of pages | 41 |
| Journal | American University Business Law Review |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2023 |
Keywords
- Football agents
- Information asymmetries
- Negative externalities
- Licensing
- Certification
- Competition
- Private regulation
- European harmonization