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Rawlsian Assignments

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Abstract

We study the assignment of indivisible goods to individuals without monetary transfers. Previous literature has mainly focused on efficiency and individually fair assignments; consequently, egalitarian concerns have been overlooked. Drawing inspiration from the allocation of apartments in housing cooperatives, where families prioritize egalitarianism in assignments, we introduce the concept of Rawlsian assignment. We demonstrate the uniqueness, efficiency and anonymity of the Rawlsian rule. Our findings are validated using cooperative housing preference data, showing significant improvements in egalitarian outcomes over both the probabilistic serial rule and the currently employed rule.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherCornell University - arXiv
Number of pages51
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 6 Jul 2022
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

SeriesarXiv.org
Number2207.02930
ISSN2331-8422

JEL classifications

  • c78 - "Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory"
  • d63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

Keywords

  • RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
  • sd-efficiency
  • fairness
  • rawls

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