Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games

Christian Seel; Elias Tsakas

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.013

Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games

Christian Seel^*
, Elias Tsakas^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

Games in which players aim to guess a fraction or multiple p of the average guess are known as guessing games or (p -)beauty contests. In this note, we derive a full characterization of the set of rationalizable strategies and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for such games as a function of the parameter p, the number of players and the (discrete) set of available guesses to each player. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	75-88
Number of pages	14
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	106
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.013
Publication status	Published - Nov 2017

Keywords

Guessing game
Beauty contest
Rationalizability

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10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.013

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title = "Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games",

abstract = "Games in which players aim to guess a fraction or multiple p of the average guess are known as guessing games or (p -)beauty contests. In this note, we derive a full characterization of the set of rationalizable strategies and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for such games as a function of the parameter p, the number of players and the (discrete) set of available guesses to each player. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.",

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AB - Games in which players aim to guess a fraction or multiple p of the average guess are known as guessing games or (p -)beauty contests. In this note, we derive a full characterization of the set of rationalizable strategies and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for such games as a function of the parameter p, the number of players and the (discrete) set of available guesses to each player. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

KW - Guessing game

KW - Beauty contest

KW - Rationalizability

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.013

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.013

M3 - Article

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games

Abstract

Keywords

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