Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games

Christian Seel*, Elias Tsakas*

*Corresponding author for this work

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Abstract

Games in which players aim to guess a fraction or multiple p of the average guess are known as guessing games or (p -)beauty contests. In this note, we derive a full characterization of the set of rationalizable strategies and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for such games as a function of the parameter p, the number of players and the (discrete) set of available guesses to each player. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)75-88
Number of pages14
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume106
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2017

Keywords

  • Guessing game
  • Beauty contest
  • Rationalizability

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