Pure subgame-perfect equilibria in free transition games.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for each player upon termination of the game, which depends only on the player who decided to terminate. We give a combinatorial proof of the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies for the games in our class.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)442-447
Number of pages6
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume199
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2009

Cite this