TY - JOUR
T1 - Pure subgame-perfect equilibria in free transition games.
AU - Kuipers, J.
AU - Flesch, J.
AU - Schoenmakers, G.
AU - Vrieze, K.
PY - 2009/1/1
Y1 - 2009/1/1
N2 - We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for each player upon termination of the game, which depends only on the player who decided to terminate. We give a combinatorial proof of the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies for the games in our class.
AB - We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for each player upon termination of the game, which depends only on the player who decided to terminate. We give a combinatorial proof of the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies for the games in our class.
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2008.11.038
DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2008.11.038
M3 - Article
SN - 0377-2217
VL - 199
SP - 442
EP - 447
JO - European Journal of Operational Research
JF - European Journal of Operational Research
ER -