Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching

B.E. Klaus, F. Klijn*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review


We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (aldershof et al. , 1999) and the random order mechanism (roth and vande vate, 1990, ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and “endstate” fairness.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)431-447
Number of pages17
JournalEconomic Theory
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2006

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