Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty

Stefan Terstiege

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.014

Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty

Stefan Terstiege^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

I study the trade-off between private and verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty. More uncertainty leads to higher agency costs if the interim evaluation is public and verifiable but lower agency costs if the interim evaluation is private and unverifiable.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	341-344
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	123
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.014
Publication status	Published - Jun 2014
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Performance evaluation
Principal-agent
Moral hazard

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10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.014

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title = "Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty",

abstract = "I study the trade-off between private and verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty. More uncertainty leads to higher agency costs if the interim evaluation is public and verifiable but lower agency costs if the interim evaluation is private and unverifiable.",

keywords = "Performance evaluation, Principal-agent, Moral hazard",

author = "Stefan Terstiege",

year = "2014",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.014",

language = "English",

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journal = "Economics Letters",

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AB - I study the trade-off between private and verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty. More uncertainty leads to higher agency costs if the interim evaluation is public and verifiable but lower agency costs if the interim evaluation is private and unverifiable.

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KW - Principal-agent

KW - Moral hazard

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.014

M3 - Article

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SP - 341

EP - 344

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

ER -

Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty

Abstract

Keywords

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