We consider an extension of atomic congestion games with altruistic or spiteful players. Restricting attention to games with affine costs, we study a special class of perception-parameterized congestion games as introduced by Kleer and Schäfer . We provide an upper bound on the price of anarchy for games with players that are sufficiently spiteful, answering an open question posed in . This completes the characterization of the price of anarchy as a function of the level of altruism/spite. We also provide an upper bound on the price of stability when players are sufficiently altruistic, which almost completes the picture of the price of stability as a function of the level of altruism/spite.
|Title of host publication||Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2020. International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory|
|Subtitle of host publication||13th International Symposium, SAGT 2020, Augsburg, Germany, September 16–18, 2020, Proceedings|
|Editors||Tobias Harks, Max Klimm|
|Publication status||Published - 8 Sep 2020|
|Series||Lecture Notes in Computer Science|
- price of anarchy
- Price of stability