@inproceedings{dd1b8d5a39cd47b3bfe0b415b5c2f776,
title = "Price of anarchy in congestion games with altruistic/spiteful players",
abstract = "We consider an extension of atomic congestion games with altruistic or spiteful players. Restricting attention to games with affine costs, we study a special class of perception-parameterized congestion games as introduced by Kleer and Sch{\"a}fer [19]. We provide an upper bound on the price of anarchy for games with players that are sufficiently spiteful, answering an open question posed in [19]. This completes the characterization of the price of anarchy as a function of the level of altruism/spite. We also provide an upper bound on the price of stability when players are sufficiently altruistic, which almost completes the picture of the price of stability as a function of the level of altruism/spite.",
keywords = "Altruism, Price of stability, Spite, price of anarchy, EQUILIBRIA, INEFFICIENCY, STABILITY, Price of anarchy",
author = "Marc Schr{\"o}der",
note = "Data source: No data used.",
year = "2020",
month = sep,
day = "8",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-57980-7_10",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-030-57979-1",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",
publisher = "Springer, Cham",
pages = "146--159",
editor = "Harks, {Tobias } and Max Klimm",
booktitle = "Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2020. International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory",
address = "Switzerland",
}