Price of anarchy in congestion games with altruistic/spiteful players

Marc Schröder*

*Corresponding author for this work

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We consider an extension of atomic congestion games with altruistic or spiteful players. Restricting attention to games with affine costs, we study a special class of perception-parameterized congestion games as introduced by Kleer and Schäfer [19]. We provide an upper bound on the price of anarchy for games with players that are sufficiently spiteful, answering an open question posed in [19]. This completes the characterization of the price of anarchy as a function of the level of altruism/spite. We also provide an upper bound on the price of stability when players are sufficiently altruistic, which almost completes the picture of the price of stability as a function of the level of altruism/spite.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2020. International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Subtitle of host publication13th International Symposium, SAGT 2020, Augsburg, Germany, September 16–18, 2020, Proceedings
EditorsTobias Harks, Max Klimm
PublisherSpringer, Cham
Number of pages14
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-57980-7
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-57979-1
Publication statusPublished - 8 Sept 2020

Publication series

SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science


  • Altruism
  • Price of stability
  • Spite
  • price of anarchy
  • Price of anarchy

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