Abstract
This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which population
monotonicity (no player is worse off when additional players enter the game) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible, which is the class of games with an egalitarian population monotonic allocation scheme. On this domain, which strictly includes the class of convex games, population monotonicity and egalitarian core selection together characterize the Dutta-Ray solution. We relate the class of games with an egalitarian population monotonic allocation scheme to several other classes of games.
monotonicity (no player is worse off when additional players enter the game) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible, which is the class of games with an egalitarian population monotonic allocation scheme. On this domain, which strictly includes the class of convex games, population monotonicity and egalitarian core selection together characterize the Dutta-Ray solution. We relate the class of games with an egalitarian population monotonic allocation scheme to several other classes of games.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Maastricht |
| Publisher | Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2 May 2024 |
Publication series
| Series | GSBE Research Memoranda |
|---|---|
| Number | 007 |
| ISSN | 2666-8807 |
JEL classifications
- c71 - Cooperative Games
Keywords
- population monotonicity
- egalitarian core
- Dutta-Ray solution