Abstract

A Sender wants to persuade multiple Receivers with homogeneous preferences and a common belief about the state of the world to vote in favor of a proposal. Prior to the vote Sender commits to a communication strategy which sends private, potentially correlated, signals to Receivers that are contingent on the true state of the world. While Sender benefits from using private messages rather than public communication if Receivers vote sincerely, under the optimal communication strategy, sincere voting is not in any Receiver’s best interest. If the proposal does not require unanimous agreement, Sender’s optimal communication strategy after which sincere voting indeed constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is such that no voter is ever pivotal.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Number of pages31
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 20 Feb 2020

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda
Number004

JEL classifications

  • c72 - Noncooperative Games
  • d72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
  • d83 - "Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief"

Keywords

  • Bayesian Persuasion
  • Strategic Voting
  • Swing Voter's Curse

Cite this

Kerman, T., Herings, P. J-J., & Karos, D. (2020). Persuading Strategic Voters. Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics. GSBE Research Memoranda, No. 004 https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2020004