Persuading communicating voters

Toygar Kerman, Anastas P. Tenev

Research output: Working paper / PreprintWorking paper

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This paper studies a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model, where a sender communicates with receivers who have homogeneous beliefs and aligned preferences. The sender wants to implement a proposal and commits to a communication strategy which sends private (possibly) correlated messages to the receivers, who are in an exogenous and commonly known network. Receivers can observe their neighbors’ private messages and after updating their beliefs, vote sincerely on the proposal. We examine how networks of shared information affect the sender’s gain from persuasion and find that in many cases it is not restricted by the additional information provided by the receivers’ neighborhoods. Perhaps surprisingly, the sender’s gain
from persuasion is not monotonically decreasing with the density of the network.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Number of pages36
Publication statusPublished - 2021

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda

JEL classifications

  • c72 - Noncooperative Games
  • d72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design"
  • d85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory


  • Bayesian persuasion
  • networks
  • voting

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