Personal norms in the online public good game

Marco Catola; Simone D'Alessandro; Pietro Guarnieri; Veronica Pizziol

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110024

Personal norms in the online public good game

Marco Catola, Simone D'Alessandro^*, Pietro Guarnieri, Veronica Pizziol

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

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Abstract

This paper shows that personal norms have a prominent role in explaining pro-social contribution in an online public good game. This finding suggests that the role of social norms might be loosened when subjects are distanced and interaction occurs online and in complete anonymity. Moreover, we found no statistically significant difference between the elicited norms and the norms that were elicited in a group of subjects not facing the contribution task, thus ruling out a potential self-justification bias.

Original language	English
Article number	110024
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	207
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110024
Publication status	Published - Oct 2021

JEL classifications

c90 - Design of Experiments: General
d71 - "Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations"
h40 - Publicly Provided Goods: General

Keywords

Public good game
Online experiment
Personal norms
Social norms
Belief elicitation
Social dilemma

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110024

Full TextFinal published version, 328 KBLicence: Taverne

Cite this

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title = "Personal norms in the online public good game",

abstract = "This paper shows that personal norms have a prominent role in explaining pro-social contribution in an online public good game. This finding suggests that the role of social norms might be loosened when subjects are distanced and interaction occurs online and in complete anonymity. Moreover, we found no statistically significant difference between the elicited norms and the norms that were elicited in a group of subjects not facing the contribution task, thus ruling out a potential self-justification bias.",

keywords = "Public good game, Online experiment, Personal norms, Social norms, Belief elicitation, Social dilemma",

author = "Marco Catola and Simone D'Alessandro and Pietro Guarnieri and Veronica Pizziol",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110024",

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AU - D'Alessandro, Simone

AU - Guarnieri, Pietro

AU - Pizziol, Veronica

N1 - data source: Data collected in an online experiment

PY - 2021/10

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N2 - This paper shows that personal norms have a prominent role in explaining pro-social contribution in an online public good game. This finding suggests that the role of social norms might be loosened when subjects are distanced and interaction occurs online and in complete anonymity. Moreover, we found no statistically significant difference between the elicited norms and the norms that were elicited in a group of subjects not facing the contribution task, thus ruling out a potential self-justification bias.

AB - This paper shows that personal norms have a prominent role in explaining pro-social contribution in an online public good game. This finding suggests that the role of social norms might be loosened when subjects are distanced and interaction occurs online and in complete anonymity. Moreover, we found no statistically significant difference between the elicited norms and the norms that were elicited in a group of subjects not facing the contribution task, thus ruling out a potential self-justification bias.

KW - Public good game

KW - Online experiment

KW - Personal norms

KW - Social norms

KW - Belief elicitation

KW - Social dilemma

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110024

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110024

M3 - Article

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JO - Economics Letters

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