Abstract
We prove that every multiplayer perfect-information game with bounded and lower-semicontinuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille [Solan, E., N. Vieille. 2003. Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games. J. Math. Econom. 39 911-929], which shows that a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semicontinuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is finite, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set of all plays and payoffs that are induced by subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in pure strategies.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 742-755 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Mathematics of Operations Research |
Volume | 35 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2010 |
Keywords
- perfect information
- subgame-perfect equilibrium
- lower-semicontinuous payoffs
- 2-PLAYER STOCHASTIC GAMES
- SUBGAME-PERFECTION
- RECURSIVE GAMES
- DETERMINACY