Perfect-information games with lower-semicontinuous payoffs

J. Flesch, J. Kuipers, A. Mashiah-Yaakovi, G. Schoenmakers, E. Solan, Koos Vrieze

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We prove that every multiplayer perfect-information game with bounded and lower-semicontinuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille [Solan, E., N. Vieille. 2003. Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games. J. Math. Econom. 39 911-929], which shows that a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semicontinuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is finite, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set of all plays and payoffs that are induced by subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in pure strategies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)742-755
Number of pages14
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Volume35
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2010

Keywords

  • perfect information
  • subgame-perfect equilibrium
  • lower-semicontinuous payoffs
  • 2-PLAYER STOCHASTIC GAMES
  • SUBGAME-PERFECTION
  • RECURSIVE GAMES
  • DETERMINACY

Cite this

Flesch, J. ; Kuipers, J. ; Mashiah-Yaakovi, A. ; Schoenmakers, G. ; Solan, E. ; Vrieze, Koos. / Perfect-information games with lower-semicontinuous payoffs. In: Mathematics of Operations Research. 2010 ; Vol. 35, No. 4. pp. 742-755.
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Perfect-information games with lower-semicontinuous payoffs. / Flesch, J.; Kuipers, J.; Mashiah-Yaakovi, A.; Schoenmakers, G.; Solan, E.; Vrieze, Koos.

In: Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 35, No. 4, 11.2010, p. 742-755.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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