@techreport{c5557c99726942d89085eb42bbe330fa,
title = "Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once",
abstract = "We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games admit no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for small positive values of ϵ. Furthermore we derive a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.",
author = "Kutay Cingiz and Janos Flesch and Herings, \{P. Jean-Jacques\} and Arkadi Predtetchinski",
note = "no data used",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.26481/umagsb.2016036",
language = "English",
series = "GSBE Research Memoranda",
publisher = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
number = "036",
address = "Netherlands",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics",
}