Perfect information games where each player acts only once

Kutay Cingiz; Janos Flesch; P. Jean-Jacques Herings; Arkadi Predtetchinski

doi:10.1007/s00199-019-01199-3

Perfect information games where each player acts only once

Kutay Cingiz, Janos Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings^*, Arkadi Predtetchinski

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect \(\epsilon \)-equilibrium for any \(\epsilon \) sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect \(\epsilon \)-equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	965-985
Number of pages	21
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	69
Issue number	4
Early online date	2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01199-3
Publication status	Published - Jun 2020

Keywords

infinitely many players
minority games
subgame perfect ϵ-equilibria
upper semicontinuous functions
Subgame perfect epsilon-equilibria
EXISTENCE
Infinitely many players
EPSILON-EQUILIBRIA
Minority games
Upper semicontinuous functions

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10.1007/s00199-019-01199-3Licence: CC BY

1 Erratum / corrigendum / retractions

Correction to: Perfect Information Games Where Each Player Acts Only Once
Cingiz, K., Flesch, J., Herings, P.J.-J. & Predtetchinski, A., Oct 2020, In: Economic Theory. 70, 3, p. 905-906 2 p.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Erratum / corrigendum / retractions › Academic

Open Access

Cite this

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title = "Perfect information games where each player acts only once",

abstract = "We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect \(\epsilon \)-equilibrium for any \(\epsilon \) sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect \(\epsilon \)-equilibrium.",

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AU - Predtetchinski, Arkadi

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Y1 - 2020/6

N2 - We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect \(\epsilon \)-equilibrium for any \(\epsilon \) sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect \(\epsilon \)-equilibrium.

AB - We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect \(\epsilon \)-equilibrium for any \(\epsilon \) sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect \(\epsilon \)-equilibrium.

KW - infinitely many players

KW - minority games

KW - subgame perfect ϵ-equilibria

KW - upper semicontinuous functions

KW - Subgame perfect epsilon-equilibria

KW - EXISTENCE

KW - Infinitely many players

KW - EPSILON-EQUILIBRIA

KW - Minority games

KW - Upper semicontinuous functions

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DO - 10.1007/s00199-019-01199-3

M3 - Article

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VL - 69

SP - 965

EP - 985

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

IS - 4

ER -

Perfect information games where each player acts only once

Abstract

Keywords

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Correction to: Perfect Information Games Where Each Player Acts Only Once

Cite this