Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once

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We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games admit no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for small positive values of ϵ. Furthermore we derive a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherMaastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Publication series

SeriesGSBE Research Memoranda

JEL classifications

  • c72 - Noncooperative Games
  • c73 - "Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games"
  • d91 - "Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving"

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