We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games admit no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for small positive values of ϵ. Furthermore we derive a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.
|Publisher||Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics|
|Publication status||Published - 2016|
|Series||GSBE Research Memoranda|
- c72 - Noncooperative Games
- c73 - "Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games"
- d91 - "Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving"
Cingiz, K., Flesch, J., Herings, P. J-J., & Predtetchinski, A. (2016). Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once. Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics. GSBE Research Memoranda, No. 036