Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market Is Incomplete

P.J.J. Herings, H.M. Polemarchakis

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Abstract

Incomplete asset markets cause competitive equilibria to be constrained suboptimal and provides scope for pareto improving interventions. In this paper, we examine how intervention in prices in asset or spot commodity markets serves this purpose. We show that, if fix-price equilibria behave sufficiently regularly near walrasian equilibria, pareto improving price regulation is generically possible. An advantage of price regulation, contrasted with interventions in individuals’ asset portfolios, is that it operates anonymously, on market variables.key wordsincomplete asset marketfix-price equilibriapareto improvement.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEssays in Honor of Birgit Grodal, Studies in Economic Theory
EditorsC Schultz, K Vind
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages225-244
Number of pages20
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2006

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