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Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
G. Csapó,
R.J. Müller
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Corresponding author for this work
Quantitative Economics
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Keyphrases
Public Goods
100%
Private Supply
100%
Optimal Mechanism Design
100%
Excludable Public Goods
100%
Polynomial Time
50%
Directed Graph
50%
Network Structure
50%
Incentive Mechanism
50%
Monotonicity Constraints
50%
Node Weight
50%
Bayes-Nash
50%
Rational Mechanism
50%
Maximal Weights
50%
Signal Distribution
50%
Informational Externalities
50%
Profit-maximizing
50%
Virtual Values
50%
INIS
design
100%
weight
100%
graphs
100%
supply
100%
values
50%
correlations
50%
constraints
50%
signals
50%
distribution
50%
closures
50%
polynomials
50%
incentives
50%
externalities
50%
profits
50%
Computer Science
Polynomial Time
100%
Directed Graphs
100%
Mechanism Design
100%
Individual Post
100%
Network Structure
100%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Public Goods
100%
Mechanism Design
100%
Externalities
33%
Mathematics
Polynomial Time
100%
Conditionals
100%