On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure

Stefan Terstiege

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.014

On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure

Stefan Terstiege^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Microeconomics & Public Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

I consider contracting with information disclosure in the sense of bayesian persuasion. A result by kamenica and gentzkow (2011) implies that if the principal contracts with a single, uninformed agent, the signal realization set can be restricted to the type set. I show that, otherwise, having additional signal realizations can be advantageous.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	83-86
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	163
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.014
Publication status	Published - Feb 2018

Keywords

Optimal contracts
Information disclosure
Bayesian persuasion

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.014

Cite this

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title = "On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure",

abstract = "I consider contracting with information disclosure in the sense of bayesian persuasion. A result by kamenica and gentzkow (2011) implies that if the principal contracts with a single, uninformed agent, the signal realization set can be restricted to the type set. I show that, otherwise, having additional signal realizations can be advantageous.",

keywords = "Optimal contracts, Information disclosure, Bayesian persuasion",

author = "Stefan Terstiege",

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AB - I consider contracting with information disclosure in the sense of bayesian persuasion. A result by kamenica and gentzkow (2011) implies that if the principal contracts with a single, uninformed agent, the signal realization set can be restricted to the type set. I show that, otherwise, having additional signal realizations can be advantageous.

KW - Optimal contracts

KW - Information disclosure

KW - Bayesian persuasion

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.014

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JO - Economics Letters

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